CLASSIFICATION OF FORECLOSURE MERGERS AS TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION EXCHANGESCLASSIFICATION OF FORECLOSURE MERGERS AS TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION EXCHANGES by unknown
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
A decision refusing exemption in the Powell case probably can not conclude
the matter, for the question will continue to arise on slightly different facts
until the incidents necessary to establish a producer-consuming classification
within the exemption provision have been determined. The ends of the Act
will best be served if, bearing in mind the failure of Congress to forbid owner-
ship of coal mines by consumers, the court looks to the length of time the
lease-contract arrangement is designed to have effect. If the reasonably long
term commitment and other corroborating circumstances are present as as-
surances of the identity of interest between the consumer and the supplierY
the effect of the arrangement upon commerce and the operation of the Act
will be little different from that in the so-called pure captive situation, for
the exemption of which there is a Congressional mandate.
CLASSIFICATION OF FORECLOSURE MERGERS AS
TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION EXCHANGES
THE tax-free exchange provisions of the Internal Revenue Code are
designed to facilitate corporate reorganizations by ignoring formal changes
in capital structure and variations in property values, and imposing no tax
until a more tangible gain or loss is realized.' The ability of a corporate or
individual taxpayer to secure non-recognition, for tax purposes, of the results
of the exchange of corporate properties is generally conditioned upon the
requirement that there be a "reorganization," as defined in Section 112
(g) (1).2 If the exchange falls within one of the categories of this definitional
53. "It is to the advantage of both coal producer and coal consumer that their rela-
tions be more or less permanent. Every time a producer abandons a market that has beeun
educated to his product, or a large consumer changes his source of supply there is intro-
duced an incentive for increased mine development. This shifting about in the search for
more profitable outlets or for cheaper and better coal must always continue in a competi-
tive business such as the bituminous coal industry, but the degree to which it has taken
place in the past six years has greatly disturbed the trade." HUNT & WILLITS, WHAr
THE COAL DIVISIoN FouND (1925) 268.
1. See SEN. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); H. R. Rtw. No. 350,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1939) 123-131.
2. "The term reorganization means (A) a statutory merger or consolidation, or
(B) the acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely for all or a part of Its
voting stock: of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another .corporation; or
of substantially all the properties of another corporation, or (C) a transfer by a
corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after
the transfer the transferor or its shareholders or both are in control of the corporation
to which the assets are transferred, or (D) a recapitalization, or (E) a mere change
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part of Section 112, other provisions of that section provide that no gain
or loss to either the individual or the corporate taxpayer shall he recognized.3
The basis provisions of Section 113 further allow a corporation to whom
depreciable property has been transferred under the exchange to charge off
depreciation thereon using the same base value as was attributed to the
property in the hands of the transferor. 4 There has been such a variety of
corporate exchanges that the question of whether any given transaction
constitutes a "reorganization" has constantly confronted the courts.? In the
controversy currently significant, corporate and individual taxpayers, par-
ticipating in mergers of insolvent companies into new going concerns at the
instigation of the old bondholders upon foreclosure, are questioning the basis
for depreciation and the recognition of gain or loss.
Common to all cases where this issue is now being litigated is the factual
situation where the bondholders of an insolvent corporation foreclose their
mortgage interests, bid in the assets at the sale, and become stockholders of
the new corporation to which they transfer the assets of the old one. From
such a transaction, two tax issues most frequently arise. First is the question
of whether an individual bondholder, in computing his taxable income, should
recognize personal gains or losses resulting from the exchange. The second
problem is whether the successor corporation can maintain the same depre-
ciation basis for the property transferred that its predecessor used.6 The
first question is governed either by Section 112(b)(3), stating that no gain
or loss will be recognized when stock is exchanged for stock in a reorganiza-
tion,7 or by Section 112(b) (4) declaring that non-recognition will also prevail
under a reorganization where property is exchanged for stock.8 The solution
in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected." LT. Rev. CoPE § 112(g) (1)
(1939).
3. Ix'T. Rv. CODE § 112(b) (3) and (4) (1939). See notes 7 and 8 in Ira.
4. IxT. REv. CODE § 113(a) (6) and (7) (1939). For § 113(a) (7) see note 9 infra.
5. For a general discussion of the reorganization provisions, see Fahey, Income
Tax Definition of Rcorganiation (1939) 39 COL L. RE%. 933.
6. Since most corporations involved in receivership mergers in the last few years
acquired depreciable assets in periods of higher prices, it is to their interest to establish
a reorganization and gain the advantage of depreciating on the basis of the high value
at which the property was originally acquired. For further consideration uf this situation
and its revenue implications see discussion infra at page.
7. "No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a
party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, exchanged solely
for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the
reorganization." Ixv. REV. CODE § 112(b)(3) (1939). Corporations involved in fore-
closure reorganizations fall well within the definition of a "party to a reorganization."
See INxT. REv. CODE § 112(g)(2) (1939).
S. "No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization
exchanges property, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, solely for stecl: or
securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization." I.T. RLv. COD § 112-
(b) (4) (1939).
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of the second is controlled by Section 113(a) (7)9 which grants the successor
corporation the same depreciation basis as its predecessor "if the property
was acquired . . . by a corporation in connection with a reorganization."' 10
Although a court would be dealing with the individual bondholders in the
first case and the successor corporations in the second, the tax liability of
each depends on whether these foreclosure mergers constitute "reorganiza-
tions" as defined in Section 112 (g)(1)."
This question has arisen in five court cases during 1941. The four Circuit
Courts of Appeals which have passed upon the point are evenly divided. In
Commissioner v. Marlborough House, Incorporated,12 the Commissioner had
assessed deficiencies against the corporation as a result of his determination
that the basis for depreciation of the property acquired by the corporation
was the price bid and paid for it at the foreclosure sale, and that the esti-
mated remaining life of the property was 45 years. The corporation, on
the other hand, claimed a greater basis and a shorter life for the property
in calculating depreciation. The Board of Tax Appeals granted the cor-
poration the larger basis, i.e., cost to the predecessor compiny.13 But this
decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which held
that there was no reorganization because the bondhold-rs had no "continuing
interest" in the original company. The court relied on the decision in the
LeTulle14 case that the receipt of bonds provides no proprietary interest in
a solvent corporation, for its interpretation of the "continuity of interest"
rule. In the recent case of Helvering v. New President Corporationt" the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also refused to allow the taxpaying cor-
poration to use the value of the property when acquired by its predecessor
9. "(a) The basis of property shall be the cost of such property; except that .. .
(7) If the property was acquired (A) after December 31, 1917, and in a taxable
year beginning before January 1, 1936, by a corporation in connection with a reor-
ganization, and immediately after the transfer an interest or control in such property
of 80 per centum or more remained in the same person or any of them, or (B) in a
taxable year beginning after December 31, 1935, by a corporation in connection with
a reorganization, then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the
transferor." INT. REV. CODE § 113 (1939).
Section 204(a) (7) of the Revenue Act of 1926 became § 113(a) (7) of the Revenue
Act of 1928 and has remained fundamentally unchanged throughout subsequent Acts.
10. As provided in the Internal Revenue Code, and corresponding sections of all
Revenue Acts from 1926 to date, §23(1) grants a reasonable allowance for deprecia-
tions, § 23(n) sets the depreciation basis at that offered in § 114, § 114 specifies that
the basis shall be the adjusted basis under § 113(b), and § 113(b) establishes the basis
as that determined in § 113(a) with adjustments. Section 113(a) then provides that the
basis shall be the cost of the property except in certain cases and § 113(a) (7) sets
out the exception for reorganizations.
11. See note 2"supra.
12. 118 F. (2d) 511 (C.C.A. 9th, 1941).
13. 40 B. T. A. 882 (1939).
14. 308 U. S. 415 (1940).
15. 122 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
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as the depreciation basis and argued that all proprietary interest in the
original company was extinguished by the foreclosure. 10
On substantially similar facts, the Second Circuit Court 'of Appeals in
Helvering v. New Haven & Shore Line Railroad Company', readied the
opposite conclusion. The bondholders of an insolvent company, pending
foreclosure by the trustee, had approved a plan of reorganization whereby
it was proposed that they should bid in the property at the foreclosure sale,
pay for it by endorsing a credit on the bonds and convey it to a newly organ-
ized operating company. The bondholders were to receive all the common
shares of the new company in return. After the plan went into effect, the
new company, in making out its income tax returns, took a deduction for
depreciation on the basis of the value of the property when the predecessor
company acquired it. The Commissioner again urged that the proper basis
for depreciation was the fair market value of the property on foreclosure,
but the Second Circuit of Appeals held that the transaction constituted a
reorganization under Section 112(g) (1) (B) of the Revenue Act of 1934.
The court reasoned that the insolvency of the predecessor company furnished
the "continuity of interest" demanded in relation to the bondholders' pro-
prietorship. Having established the occurrence of a reorganization, the court
applied Section 113(a)(7)18 and concluded that the basis should be the
cost to the transferor company. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit likewise held that a similar situation constituted a reorganization
in Commissioner v. Southwest Consolidated Corporation,0 where the suc-
cessor corporation wrote off part of the assets at their old value. The court
reiterated its conclusion in Commissioner z,. Alabama Asphaltic Co;pa;zny,2
where the proper depreciation basis was the issue. In the latter case the
court declared the LeTudle case was not in point, and held that there was
16. If the court fails to find a reorganization, the basis becomes the smaller one
of the value of the property in the hands of the committee. The Federal Income Tax
Regulations specify: ". . . if the creditor buys in the mortgaged or pledged property . . .
The fair market value shall be presumed to be the amount for which it is bid in by
the ta-payer in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary. If the
creditor subsequently sells the property so acquired, the basis for determining gain
or loss is the fair market value of the property at the date of acquisition." Reg. 103,
§ 19.23(k)-3; Reg. 101, 94 and 86, Art. 23(k)-3; Reg. 77 and 74, Art. 193; Reg. 69,
Art. 153 (first adoption of the rule). Satisfied that there v.as clear and convincing
proof, the court in the ANcw Prcsident Corporation case found the fair market value
to be other than the cost to the committee.
17. 121 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
18. See note 9 supra.
19. 119 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
20. 119 F. (2d) 819 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941). Here general creditors rather than bhnd-
holders were involved, but the court sought no distinction on that basis. It attempted
to distinguish the Marlborough House case on the wholly untenable ground that there
was no pre-existing plan of reorganization.
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a reorganization under Section 112 of the Revenue Act of 1928,21 the rationale
being that the old corporation was not terminated upon foreclosure; it still
had title to its properties, according to the court, but the creditors rather
than the stockholders became the beneficial owners and a continuing interest
was maintained by them after the exchange of properties for the stock of
the new company.
Since all these conflicting decisions have been reached on the basis of
the continuity of interest rule, resolution of the tax problem demands, first
of all, an analysis of the substance of that rule.2 2 Prior to 1934, Part A
of the statutory definition of a reorganization, under which the foreclosure-
merger situation falls, called for a transfer by a corporation of a majority
of its stock or of substantially all of its assets, 2 3 but made no provision as
to the consideration which was to be received from the transferee. Literal
compliance with Section 112 could thus be secured by an exchange for cash,
which would not harmonize with the legislative purpose of exempting only
transactions where nothing tangible was shaken loose from the risks of the
business enterprise. To keep the definition within its intended scope, the
courts added the continuity requirement.
As formulated, the rule requires that the owners of the equity interest "
in the transferor corporation retain a continuing proprietary interest in the
transferee corporation after the reorganization exchange. For example, if
A Corporation sells securities or property to B Corporation and B Corpora-
tion gives A Corporation x in exchange, x must represent such a type of
security as will give the equity owners of A Corporation a proprietary
interest in B Corporation.2 r, By 1937 the courts had held that, in addition
to an exchange for common shares, if x was such an interest as 44% cash
plus the remainder in voting stock,2 6 or if it was preferred stock,2 7 or 50%
21. Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926, § 203 (h) (I) ; Revenue Acts of 1928 and 1932,
§ 112(i) (1). In each of the Acts the sections read: "The term 'reorganization' means
(A) a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation of at
least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of all other classes of stock
of another corporation, or substantially all the properties of another corporation).
$ . ." This embodies the oft-mentioned "parenthetical clause" of the pre-1934 Acts.
22. The rule grew out of Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 937
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 599 (1933), and Pinellas Ice and Cold
Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U. S. 462 (1933).
For a discussion of the "continuity of interest" doctrine, see (1940) 49 YALE L. J.
1079.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. The stockholders own the equity interest in a solvent corporation, It is sub-
mitted that the equity interest passes to the bondholders upon insolvency.
25. The equity owners of A Corporation may obtain this proprietary interest either
indirectly by the acquisition and retention of .x by A Corporation, or directly by im-
mediate distribution of x to the equity owners.
26. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U. S. 378 (1935).
27. Nelson v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 374 (1935).
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stock and the balance in bonds2 a proprietary interest in B Corporation
was received and the rule was satisfied.
Before 1937, however, no court had considered whether there would be
a continuity of interest maintained if x was entirely bonds, or whether the
continuity of interest rule applied when not x but the original interest in
A Corporation was under consideration. The first case concerning the status
to be accorded the situation where foreclosing bondholders bid in the property
at the foreclosure osale and transferred it to a newly organized company in
return for the stock of the latter then came before the Circuit Court for
the Seventh Circuit.29 A bondholder attempted to deduct from his income
tax returns a loss suffered in the exchange, and, though the court might
have permitted non-recognition of the loss under Section 112(b)(5) 20 even
if there were no "reorganization," it chose to rest its decision on the ground
that a reorganization within the contemplation of Section 112(i)(1)31
had occurred, creating non-recognition under Section 112(b)(3) 32 Shortly
afterwards, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to decide
the same issue where a successor corporation was seeking the larger depre-
ciation basis under its claim that a tax-free reorganization had occurred.m
In holding for the taxpayer the court decided that the larger "basis," the
cost to the transferor, was proper under Section 113(a)(7).34 Although
it was contended that the requisite "continuity of interest" was lacking
because the bondholders were devoid of a continuing interest in the original
company, neither court made it clear whether its determination that a
reorganization had taken place rested on the belief that (1) such continuity
was present or that (2) it had rejected the attempt to apply the continuity
rule against the original interest of the bondholders in the predecessor
company.
These cases determined that a reorganization had occurred under ite
foreclosure mergers, and litigation on the point subsided for a time.35 But
28. Helvering v. Watts, 296 U. S. 387 (1935).
29. Comm'r v. Kitselman, 89 F. (2d) 458 (C. C.A. 7th, 1937). For a criticism
of this decision on the ground it gives insolvent corporations a "basis windfall" far
above the market value of the assets, see Surrey, Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation
of Indebtedness (1940) 49 YAIz L. J. 1153, 1187.
30. The relevant part of the Section reads: "No gain or loss shall be recognized
if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in eachange
for stock or securities in such corporation, and immediately after the eachange such
person or persons are in control of the corporation. . . ." It will be noted that there
is no prerequisite of a "reorganization." INT. Rv. COD §112(b)(5) (1939). The
court was interpreting the Revenue Act of 1928, identical in the wording of this section.
31. See note 21 supra.
32. See note 7 supra.
33. Comm'r v. Newberry Lumber and Coal Co., 94 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
34. See note 9 supra.
35. See Frederick L. Leckie, 37 B. T. A. 252 (1933), where the ta.zpayer presum-
ably had no reason to appeal from a decision of the Board that a reorganization had
occurred.
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the controversy was rekindled as a result of' the decision in LeTulle v,.
Scofield.3" LeTulle was the sole stockholder of a solvent irrigation company
whose assets were transferred to a solvent water company in exchange for
$50,000 cash and $750,000 in its bonds. LeTulle received the cash and
bonds in the form of a dividend from the irrigation company, which was
dissolved immediately thereafter. Seeking to escape additional income tax
assessments, he contended that this was a tax-free reorganization within
the purview of Section 112 of the Revenue Act of 1932, 4ut the court held
that the receipt of bonds in exchange did not provide the necessary con-
tinuity of interest.3 7 The decision was put on the ground that creditors,
though the maturity of their debts might be distant and might be secured
by a lien, still had no interest in the debtor's property. As a result of this
determination it soon became apparent that the status of a merger instigated
by the bondholders of an insolvent company was again thrown into doubt,
as the appeal of the question to five of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
during the first six months of this year and the resulting decisions indicate.
The injection of the LeTulle case as a precedent into the confusion sur-
rounding the treatment of the foreclosure merger situation has attained
partial success. Some courts have accepted that decision as a determinant
of the fact that a continuity of interest is lacking when the rule is applied
to bondholders' stakes in insolvent companies." But other courts have
more properly held that the case has no bearing on the issue.30 The LeTulle
case may be distinguished on its facts, for the court was there treating the
bonds of a solvent corporation. Unfortunately the Supreme Court did not
clarify its position, for, although it mentioned one of the earlier foreclosure
cases,40 it expressed neither approval nor disapproval of the decision.
In the fundamental argument against a reorganization which has been
advanced in the recent cases, it is urged that the bondholders lack a continuity
of interest.41 The LeTulle case stands for the proposition that there must
36. 308 U. S. 415 (1940), 53 HARV. L. REV. 683. A companion decision is Helvering
v. Tyng, 308 U. S. 527 (1940).
37. See Silverson, The Meaning of LeTulle v. Scofield (1940) 18 TAXES 492.
38. Comm'r v. Marlborough House, Inc., 118 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941);
Helvering v. New President Corp., 122 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
39. Helvering v. New Haven & Shore Line R. R., 121 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941) ; Comm'r v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 119 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941);
Comm'r v. Alabama Asphaltic Co., 119 F. (2d) 819 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
40. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415, 420n (1940).
41.- Under .a weaker line of argument, sometimes utilized, an attempt is made to
dismember the plan by separating it into several stages viewing the sale to the bond-
holders upon foreclosure as an independent transaction, and treating the sale of the
properties to the newly organized corporation, in exchange for its stock, as though
it stood alone. Such efforts have been constantly repudiated by the courts tinder the
"single transaction" rule. Cf. Snowden v. McCabe, 111 F. (2d) 743 (C.CA. 6th,
1940); Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F. (2d) 732 (C. C.A. 4th, 1938); Bassick
v. Comm'r, 85 F. (2d) 8 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1936); Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Matter,
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be a retention of a "proprietary interest" and a "substantial stake in the
enterprise" in order to constitute a reorganization. Vith this in mind some
courts have reasoned that debts are payable in money and give creditors
neither the power to control the debtor's property nor any concern vith its
vicissitudes; creditors do not share in the debtor's gains nor suffer from
its losses. While this must be admitted in respect to a solvent, going con-
cern, the incidence of insolvency alters the secured creditor's status. The
stockholders' interest is then worthless or, at best, uncertain. 42
While admitting that insolvency does make a difference, some courts have
still held that, with the extinction of the stockholders' interest upon fore-
closure, all interests in the corporation have been wiped out. But this position
seems fallacious since the control of the corporation passes to the secured
creditors under the prior contract of indebtedness upon insolvency and fore-
closure. The creditors become the beneficial owners of the property and need
only to utilize prescribed legal formalities to become the legal owners thereof.
Courts have constantly said the receipt of the stock of the new corpora-
tion in exchange for the properties of the old one admittedly satisfies the
requirement of a substantial and material stake in the enterprise. Owner-
ship has thus been exchanged for ownership, and the continuity rule seems
to be satisfied.
Moreover, it seems that the rule was never meant to apply to the original
interest the reorganizers held in A Corporation. When A Corporation trans-
ferred property or securities to B Corporation in return for the consideration,
.r, from B Corporation, the courts looked at x to determine whether a con-
tinuing proprietary interest in B Corporation existed. x and the interest
it provided in B Corporation were the sole objects of scrutiny under the
continuity of interest requirement. Thus the purpose of the continuity
rule was to fill the gap in the parenthetic clause of Section 112(i)(1) of
the Revenue Acts of 1928 and 19 3 2 43 and corresponding sections of prior
66 F. (2d) 309 (C. C.A. 10th, 1933); Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Comm'r, 53 F. (2d) 937
(C. C. A. 10th, 1932). The courts continually emphasize the principle that the substance,
rather than the form, of a series of transactions, is controlling.
Application of the single transaction rule is complicated by the many factual situa-
tions under which it may arise. For a general treatment of the doctrine, see PAUL,
STUDIES IN FEDERAL, TAXA.%TION, (2d Ser. 1938) 200-254.
42. Although the position of the stockholders in a foreclosure proceeding differs
slightly from that under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act [48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C.
§207 (1934)] the analogy is close enough to warrant reference to such decisions
as Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 303 U. S. 106, 115 (1939), rch'9
denied, 303 U. S. 637 (1939), holding that the "fair and equitable" provision of §77B
requires the elimination of the stockholders of a corporation in favor of the bond-
holders where the debtor corporation is insolvent, not only in the equity sense, but also
in the bankruptcy sense, unless the stockholders supply a consideration sufficient to
justify their participation. Cf. also In re 620 Church Street Corp., 299 U. S. 24, 27
(1936).
43. See note 21 supra.
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statutes. Lacking statutory regulation of the consideration which might be
received from the transferee, the courts sought to delimit such a "reorgan-
ization" exchange in order to achieve the objective sought by the tax-free
exceptions granted in the statute.44 That the continuity rule concerned only
the consideration received by the transferor is shown by the fact that, when
the rule was written into Section 112(g) (1) (B) of the Revenue Act of
1934 and subsequent acts, it was expressed merely in the words: "...
in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock." 45 Nor have the
courts applied the rule otherwise except in the foreclosure cases now in
litigation. The LeTulle case did not depart from the definition of the rule
in terms of the exchange given by the transferee; hence, that case is no
authority for extending the continuity of interest requirement to the situation
in receivership mergers where bondholders' interest in the original company,
the transferor, is under surveillance. The continuity requirement is such
an excellent argumentative device that the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
counsel for taxpayers naturally have attempted to extend its application.
It is submitted that extension of the continuity rule to the original interest
in the transferor is unwarranted and should be rejected.
The proper limits of the continuity rule should encompass only the interest
retained in the transferee at the completion of the transaction, and the nature
of the original investment in the transferor should be disregarded in deter-
mining the character of the plan purporting to be a reorganization. To treat
the original interest as irrelevant would produce no unjust consequences.
If the bondholders of a solvent corporation were to receive, without the
consent of the stockholders of the old corporation, the stock of a new cor-
poration to whom the assets of the original corporation were transferred,
the transaction would be objectionable on the wholly independent ground
that it was a fraud on the stockholders; if the bondholders of an insolvent
corporation acquire the stock of the transferee they are only receiving a legal
exchange. Thus it would seem that there has been a reorganization in these
44. Cf. Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 937 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932),
cert. denied, 288 U. S. 599 (1933); Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Conmm'r,
287 U. S. 462 (1933).
45. It is apparent that a foreclosure reorganization cannot fall within the definition
under § 112(g) (1) (B) of the 1934 and subsequent Revenue Acts unless the exchange
has been solely for voting stock. See note 2 supra. However, reorganizations falling
to satisiy this requirement may still come within § l12(g) (1) (C) if the bondholders
may be treated as "stockholders" and if the requisite of control of the transferee can
be met. For a general discussion of the "control" provisions of the Revenue Act, see
(1941) 50 YALE L. 3. 1237.
Even in the absence of a "reorganization" the bondholder-taxpayer may attain non-
recognition of gain or loss under § 112(b) (5) if he can show that the amount of stock
and securities received is in proportion to his interest in the property prior to the
exchange. For § 112(b) (5) see note 30 supra.
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receivership cases both within the literal definition in Section 11240 and the
underlying purpose of the tax-free exception, since no "realized" gain has
been shorn from the business res.47 It is submitted that the Supreme Court,
when called upon to resolve the problem, should limit the LeTulle case and
classify foreclosure mergers as "reorganizations." 4 8
To take the stand that a reorganization has occurred may well have an
adverse effect on governmental revenues. Establishment of the basis of
depreciation at cost to the original company will invariably provide a larger
base value, will allow greater deductions for depreciation and will reduce
ultimate corporate tax liability. Non-recognition of gain or luss to the in-
dividual or corporate taxpayer, however, will not necessarily result in a
diminution of tax revenues, for a non-recognition of gain carries with it a
non-recognition of loss and the corporation or bondholder will be unable
to deduct losses sustained from the transaction in arriving at a net income
figure. Conceding a possible fall in tax returns, the expressed legislative
policy can be met only by classifying foreclosure mergers as tax-free reor-
ganizations.
46. If the reorganization proceeds under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act [48 S,,T.
912, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (1934)] it has been held not to be a "statutory merger or con-
solidation" within the definition under § 112(g) (1) (A), but may qualify under § 112-
(g) (1) (C) if the requirements of that section are met. James Q. Newton Trust,
42 B. T.A. 473 (1940).
47. It is possible that, under some situations, the foreclosure reorganizations may
involve the question of whether the transferee corporation acquires "substantially all
the assets" of the transferor, under § 112(g) (1) (B) of the definition, since the ordinary
corporate mortgage covers real estate but not cash or stock in trade; hence, coverage
is less than all of the properties of the mortgagor.
48. The Court has granted certiorari in the Marlborough House, SouthZeest Con-
solidated, and Alabama Asphaltic Limestone cases. (1941) 10 U. S. L. WVEEK 3122.
Petition for certiorari has also been filed in Palm Springs Holding Corp. v. Comn'r,
119 F. (2d) 846 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) (bondholder retained assets bought in at fore-
closure sale). The facts are not on all fours with the foreclosure mergers but the
issue is so analogous that a decision by the Supreme Court might encompass both
situations.
